European defense policy - Different threat perceptions
At the informal meeting of the EU defense ministers, closer European cooperation was also discussed - but this is difficult to implement because the member states perceive very different threats, says security expert Torben Schütz in the Dlf.
The gas dispute in the eastern Mediterranean, the protests in Belarus, the military coup in Mali - the European defense ministers had many trouble spots to discuss at their informal meeting in Berlin on August 26th. Above all of this there is the fundamental question: How can a common European defense and security policy succeed? Torben Schütz is an expert on European defense policy at the German Society for Foreign Policy (DGAP). He says: The eastern and northeastern states in the EU would especially fear the influence of Russia; the states in southern Europe, on the other hand, are more concerned that the instability in the Middle East and North Africa could spill over to Europe.
Katharina Peetz: What are the biggest obstacles to a closer common defense policy of the EU?
Torben Schütz: At the political level, the biggest problem is actually a different perception of threats between the European partner countries or member states. That means, on the one hand, we have a very traditional threat perception, especially in the eastern and north-eastern member states, which have feared Russia and its destabilizing activities since 2014. This of course also has to do with their own historical experience as countries occupied by the Soviet Union at the time.
On the other hand, in the south you have above all a threat perception that sees its focus more on instability in the south and in the Middle East of Europe and the problems caused by it such as transnational crime or migration flows. Getting those two things under one roof is not that easy, because of course it affects how they plan their capabilities, how they structure their armed forces, and the like.
Peetz: Now the declared goal is to develop a strategic compass - it should be in place by the end of 2022 - and to work out a threat analysis beforehand. How exactly does it work, what could be the findings from it?
The EU must agree who it sees as a threat
Schütz: The strategic compass is certainly one of the most important goals for this six-month period of the German Council Presidency, and basically, as you said, the first step of this strategic compass is to define a threat perception at EU level. In the best case scenario, this should be more than the sum of the threat perceptions of the states, and the declared aim is also to take an all-round view, i.e. geographically on the one hand, i.e. to include both the threat perception of the eastern and southern partners, but also to go beyond new fields such as addressing cyber threats, information warfare, hybrid warfare.
The first step is to merge the threat analyzes - or threat perception - and in further steps one would like to try to concretise the whole thing and then actually develop a kind of European catalog of skill requirements.
This strategic compass basically has four categories in which these threat perceptions should first be analyzed. That is the resilience of society, something like information warfare is part of it. These are skills, so the classic question of what do we actually need, for example in terms of military skills, that is the question of partnerships as a third factor, with whom we can work and how. Great Britain, for example, is certainly right at the forefront as a traditional partner of European security. The fourth topic is the topic of crisis management, so how can you actually try to address instability in our immediate surroundings?
Peetz: Well, these are rather medium-term goals, but the current situation shows a particular urgency in various trouble spots in and around Europe. So what would be urgent measures that the EU could take together in its security and defense policy?
Schütz: I think that negotiating measures are particularly acute, that is, a clear common European voice to address the crises. I think it is relatively clear that there is a comparatively clear European voice on Belarus and the condemnation of the violence and non-recognition of the election, there are negotiations led by Germany on the escalation in the eastern Mediterranean. And of course there are still the European missions, for example in Libya, border surveillance and of course Operation Irini at sea to monitor the arms embargo.
So the EU is already doing a lot, I think that a common political voice is really important. The problem with many sub-areas of this European or the creation of a single European security and defense policy is actually that it is a slowly moving policy area. Conflicts can develop quickly, but if you want to address and reform the politics and structures surrounding these conflicts, then unfortunately it usually takes longer.
Cooperation with NATO "extremely important"
Peetz: What role does cooperation with NATO play - especially when we look to the Eastern Mediterranean, where two NATO partners, Turkey and Greece, are on a confrontational course?
Schütz: I believe that cooperation with NATO is extremely important for the EU and, exactly the other way around, cooperation with the EU is also very important for NATO. It is not for nothing that the two organizations have developed a total of 74 projects where they want to work more closely together. In the Eastern Mediterranean the situation is of course very problematic when two NATO partner states carry out military maneuvers in the immediate vicinity and more or less with direct reference to the other.
I still believe that the organization itself can play a mediating role, but I believe that the commitment of leading member states is still more important and, in the absence of the USA, it is actually a very important task for Germany to take on this leading negotiating role, especially against the background that France made a political decision relatively quickly and took its side very clearly on the side of Greece, and I believe that in this case it would fall to Germany in particular to take on the mediating and initially de-escalating role of negotiation.
Peetz: You are already talking about Germany and France, because in the past there were definitely differences in their position on a European defense policy. How has that perhaps changed?
Schütz: Originally, Germany was actually very focused on a European defense policy that was as inclusive as possible, which includes all member states, and France wanted more of an ambitious European security and defense policy that could possibly get by without all partners, who had the political will and the military, so to speak Has skills, is welcome to participate. Germany prevailed at the time, and France adapted to the extent that, so to speak, it now uses the instruments that were then designed to be very inclusive, such as permanent structured cooperation, and in retrospect has basically recognized the value, and that too can have these inclusive instruments.
But of course both still have partially different perspectives. That concerns NATO, for example. France still wants a much more ambitious European, independent European defense policy, even if one participates in these inclusive formats or uses them to become more ambitious.
Of course, you can also see a certain divergence in relation to NATO, which continues to be the absolute core pillar of European and German security for Germany and France traditionally tries to break away from it. And finally, as I just said, with regard to the Eastern Mediterranean, there was, I would say, some resentments between French activism, if I may now say that somewhat disrespectfully, and a German approach that has tried hard to get behind to convey the scenes.
